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Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau is known for his challenge to Canada’s NATO policy at 
the beginning of his tenure in power and his peace initiative at its end. Less well known is 
his support for innovative arms control policies designed to eliminate the technological 
impetus behind the nuclear arms race between the US and the USSR during the Cold 
War. At the first UN Special Session on Disarmament in May 1978, Trudeau delivered a 
speech outlining a “strategy of suffocation” that provided a novel package of four arms 
control measures that, taken as a whole, would represent an effective means of halting 
and eventually reversing the nuclear arms race. Although the superpowers were largely 
indifferent to them, these ideas helped spur the Department of External Affairs to invest 
in developing the institutional capacity to enable Canada to play a leadership role in 
future disarmament diplomacy.  
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Pierre Trudeau and the “Suffocation” of the Nuclear Arms Race 
As prime minister, Pierre Trudeau’s involvement in issues of nuclear arms control and 
grand strategy is usually attributed to the early days of his government or to his final days in 
power. At the start of his leadership was the series of decisions beginning in 1969 to terminate 
nuclear weapon operational roles for Canadian forces, first in Europe and then in Canada.1 
Toward the end of his tenure as prime minister was his “peace initiative” of 1983–84 with its aim 
to revitalize East-West strategic cooperation during one of the darkest periods of the Cold War.2 
Probably less well known is Prime Minister Trudeau’s address to the UN General 
Assembly’s First Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) delivered on 26 May 1978. In 
this speech, Trudeau set out what became known as a “strategy of suffocation” aimed at curbing 
the nuclear arms race underway between the United States and the Soviet Union, the 
superpowers of the day. This speech represented a major conceptual and practical contribution 
by the Government of Canada to moderating (and eventually reversing) the supercharged 
competition in nuclear forces pursued by the two superpowers. It also heralded an enhancement 
of Canada’s bureaucratic capacity as part of an effort to have Canada play a more active role in 
shaping the multilateral agenda for arms control and disarmament. 
Given that public displays of original thinking by a NATO member on strategic relations 
were not exactly smiled upon by Washington, or by its junior nuclear weapon partner the UK, 
Trudeau’s speech was also remarkable in its willingness to advocate new policy directions for 
the nuclear powers that went beyond their comfort zones. 
How such an innovative address was developed by the bureaucracy and championed by 
the highest political level is the focus of this article. It considers the context in which the 
Canadian position for UNSSOD I was formed and the aims the then Department of External 
Affairs developed for this unprecedented UN session. It then tries to identify the influences on 
                                                          
1 Ivan Head and Pierre Trudeau, The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada’s Foreign Policy 1968–1984 (Toronto: 
McLelland & Stewart, 1995), 65–95. 
2 J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1990), 363–376. 
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the Canadian statement, including the personal interest the prime minister showed in the 
initiative, as it went through various drafts, and assess its key ideas. It concludes with some 
reflections on the impact of the speech and its significance for future Canadian and multilateral 
arms control and disarmament policy.  
The UN and the Disarmament Issue 
The United Nations General Assembly has been preoccupied from its inception with the 
pursuit of international security and the need for disarmament. Indeed, the first resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly at its inaugural session in January 1946 was devoted to these 
concerns and in particular to the threat posed by the atomic bomb. The title of the first resolution 
was “Establishment of a Commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic 
energy” and the Atomic Energy Commission it created was tasked with developing proposals for 
inter alia “the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major 
weapons adaptable to mass destruction.”3 
Initial efforts to reach a consensus on a mechanism for the international control of atomic 
energy and the elimination of nuclear weapons quickly foundered in the face of mistrust among 
the leading powers with the advent of the Cold War. The General Assembly’s concern with the 
threats posed by what became known as weapons of mass destruction only deepened in the 
subsequent years as the animosity of the Cold War and the arms race grew more intense. With 
the Security Council, the UN’s principal organ for dealing with threats to international peace and 
security, effectively paralyzed due to Cold War conflict, states had to look to the General 
Assembly to express the concerns of the UN membership. Its annual sessions would routinely 
generate several resolutions on the disarmament theme, but to scant practical effect. The “near 
death experience” of the Cuban missile crisis and growing public concern over the deleterious 
effects of radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear testing did lead in 1963 to the Partial Test 
Ban Treaty, but little else in terms of multilateral accomplishments. In 1969 the General 
Assembly declared a “Disarmament Decade” in an effort to encourage states to take further 
                                                          
3 UN General Assembly Resolution 1, 24 January 1946. 
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action. The conclusion of the (Nuclear) Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT, which entered into effect 
in 1970) was an important achievement in halting the spread of nuclear weapons but had little 
impact on the quantitative and qualitative growth of nuclear arsenals on the part of the nuclear 
weapon states. The negative implications of this superpower arms race for both the security and 
the developmental goals of the UN were increasingly in evidence. 
Against this backdrop, the General Assembly decided to convene the first special session 
of the assembly to be devoted to disarmament, and UNSSOD I was duly scheduled for the period 
23 May to 28 June 1978. Commencing in the spring of 1977, preparatory committees were 
formed to develop the outcome of the special session, and the secretary general solicited the 
views of member states on what might be accomplished at the meeting.  
Developing a Canadian Position 
The responsibility for developing a Canadian reply to the secretary general’s request fell 
to the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs. Its 
director, T.C. Hammond, who had considerable insight into nuclear affairs from his earlier 
posting at Canada’s delegation to the International Atomic Energy Agency, was the author of the 
initial memorandum outlining a possible course of action. Hammond proposed that Canada’s 
priority goals for the special session should be to promote “effective measures to curb the 
superpower arms race” and to seek “to buttress the nonproliferation system by mitigating its 
current discriminatory features.”4 The reference to “discriminatory features” reflected concerns 
that the recently concluded NPT set up a two-tier category of membership—the five nuclear 
weapon states and all the rest, the non-nuclear weapon states. While this was to be only a 
temporary distinction pending achievement of the nuclear disarmament foreseen in the treaty, the 
Cold War build-up of nuclear arsenals was already raising concerns that the categories of nuclear 
haves and have nots would become permanent. 
                                                          
4 T.C. Hammond (DFD), memorandum to Klaus Goldschlag (PDG), 13 April 1977, Department of External Affairs, 
RG 25 11525, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa (LAC). 
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In his memorandum, Hammond related these broad goals to specific objectives such as 
extending the existing partial ban on nuclear tests to a comprehensive prohibition on nuclear 
testing and negotiating a convention to ban chemical weapons. Hammond also stressed the 
responsibility of the superpowers to take action to stem the nuclear arms race, urging “the two 
major nuclear weapon powers to intensify their efforts to reach further agreements to curtail the 
strategic nuclear arms confrontation in both its quantitative and its qualitative dimensions.”5 
Behind all these proposals was a reflection of the strategic goals of curbing the nuclear arms race 
(by constraining vertical proliferation based on nuclear testing) and removing discriminatory 
features (both the comprehensive test ban’s and the chemical weapons convention’s prohibitions 
would apply to all signatories), as well as contributing to the longer term goal of eliminating 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
Demonstrating his awareness of the political/diplomatic context in which his proposals 
would be received, Hammond, in classic bureaucratic fashion, depicted his ideas as falling in the 
middle of a spectrum of international opinion on the subject. He wrote: “While some of its 
provisions may be considered too bold (by some of our NATO allies, for example) or too 
conservative (by some of the non-aligned extremists, for example), it does represent an attempt 
to sketch out roughly a reasonable, but activist approach.”6 
The department’s senior officials seemed to receive Hammond’s memorandum 
positively, although it was deemed prudent, given that the Canadian reply would eventually be 
made public, to convey its gist to the secretary of state for external affairs (SSEA) to obtain 
ministerial approval for the proposed Canadian approach. In September 1977 a memorandum to 
the minister was forwarded by the undersecretary of state for external affairs, Allan Gotlieb, 
seeking concurrence on the UNSSOD I strategy and its public dimension.  
                                                          
5 Ibid., 6. 
6 Ibid., 2. 
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UNSSOD and Public Diplomacy 
The upcoming special session was generating considerable attention in Canada among 
concerned academics and NGOs and the September 1977 memorandum was perhaps most 
striking for the innovative steps proposed by the undersecretary for managing this new public 
aspect of the diplomatic process. Since his appointment as undersecretary of state earlier that 
year, Allan Gotlieb had championed a foreign policy that was more interactive with the public 
than the traditional practice. According to one observer, “Gotlieb had become the leading 
advocate in the Canadian Department of External Affairs [DEA] for the sophisticated and long 
term use of public diplomacy.”7 In so doing he was also reflecting Prime Minister Trudeau’s 
desire to “shake up the External Affairs bureaucracy” and relying on the trusted adviser role he 
had already established with Trudeau when the latter was minister of justice.8 
Notwithstanding his own considerable knowledge of multilateral disarmament affairs, 
gleaned during a posting at Canada’s delegation in Geneva, Gotlieb suggested that in order to 
assist in development of Canadian policy for the special session, DEA should convene a 
consultative panel of up to twelve persons “representing a cross section of views and selected on 
the basis of their ability to make a contribution to the development of Canadian policy.”9 
Furthermore, in order to provide a focal point for the department’s interaction with interested 
NGOs, Gotlieb proposed the “designation of a senior department official to serve on a full-time 
basis as coordinator with particular responsibility for liaison with NGOs and the Canadian 
public.”10 This early example of a dedicated consultation with a stakeholder community and the 
provision of a capacity for ongoing “public diplomacy” and “outreach” was an innovation for the 
department and a test for some of its habitual practices. This novelty was evident especially in 
Gotlieb’s recognition that such liaison duties could not simply be an add-on to regular 
responsibilities, and that the officer in question would have to be taken off-line and be free to 
travel outside Ottawa to fulfill this new mandate. Ken Williamson, who had previously 
                                                          
7 Andrew F. Cooper, “Playing by numbers: Allan Gotlieb, public diplomacy and the management of Canada-US 
relations,” The Fletcher Forum (Fall 1989): 96. 
8 Granatstein and Bothwell, Pirouette, 11–12. 
9 Allan Gotlieb, memorandum to the Minister for External Affairs, 23 September 1977, 1. 
10 Ibid., 2. 
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established an Academic Relations Division for the department, was the chosen official. In 
making this appointment, Gotlieb may have been counting on Williamson making good use of 
the ties he had established in academic circles to bring on board individuals whose expertise 
could generate alternative views to those emerging from the bureaucracy itself. He may also 
have hoped that by “co-opting” some of these individuals, public criticism of governmental 
policies would be muted.  
The policy development process for UNSSOD I went into higher gear early in 1978 with 
attention focused on how specifically the goal of curbing the superpower arms race could be 
carried out. One step would be to stop the production of the fissile materials (i.e., the enriched 
uranium and plutonium) that were the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons. The idea of a 
treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, an objective the UN General 
Assembly had endorsed since 1957, was a natural link to the goal of countering both vertical and 
horizontal proliferation. If the fissile material tap were turned off, no new nuclear weapons could 
be manufactured. References to the envisaged Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) began to 
feature in departmental communications although, given the possibility of a cool response from 
some nuclear allies, the minister was consulted in February 1978 regarding whether to include 
the FMCT among the Canadian proposals to be put forward at the UN. Ministerial guidance was 
cautious, suggesting that the department “continue our soundings about attitudes of other 
governments towards cut-off idea” and flagging that a “crucial factor in Canada’s decision will 
be attitude of Americans.”11 DEA officials working on international security files would be 
equally sensitive to the views of Canada’s principal ally. 
While consultations were pursued with US officials, Washington did not appear to 
oppose the FMCT idea, and there was even evidence that the Americans were contemplating 
putting forward at UNSSOD a proposal similar to the Canadian one. The US Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) had been conducting a study on the cutoff idea, which was still 
ongoing at the time of UNSSOD but led allies to inquire as to American intentions.12 
Communications from the Canadian High Commission in London reported, however, that the 
                                                          
11 Telegram DFD 96 to PRMNY (Permanent Mission to the UN New York), 22 February 1978. 
12 ACDA telegram to US Embassy Bonn, 1 May 1978, www.wikileaks.org. 
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UK was concerned with the non-discriminatory feature of the proposal and the requirement to 
accept intrusive verification that would flow from any such treaty. Hammond was robust in 
rebutting this concern, writing that “Verification remains fundamental and integral part of 
Canadian arms control and disarmament policy and without this element, proposal would be 
meaningless and unacceptable.”13 Although Allied reaction was a concern, the FMCT proposal 
was retained for the time being in the Canadian repertoire for UNSSOD. 
A Metaphor Emerges and Prime Ministerial Engagement 
While Hammond and his colleagues regarded maintaining the integrity of the Canadian 
proposals as a prime concern, there was also the question of how best to depict these proposals 
when they were eventually presented in public as part of the Canadian statement at UNSSOD I. 
The metaphor of suffocation that was ultimately applied to the Canadian ideas for countering the 
arms race appears to have originated in a communication from Hammond to Klaus Goldschlag, 
the responsible assistant undersecretary, when the former noted that regardless of the actual 
outcome of the special session, Canada “can make a clear statement based on a serious analysis 
of the present strategic situation and advocating specific steps to initiate the process of throttling 
the nuclear arms race.”14 
Hammond may have been playing back a variant to his superior that the latter had already 
introduced into the departmental vocabulary. According to Legault and Fortman, in their study of 
Canadian disarmament policy, “The term ‘suffocation’ was first coined by one of Canada’s most 
brilliant diplomats, Klaus Goldschlag, during private discussions at a symposium attended by the 
Prime Minister. The Prime Minister was intrigued by this turn of phrase, and it became part of 
diplomatic usage.”15 
Whatever the true origins of the “suffocation” term, the image may well have been used 
during a meeting with the prime minister organized in early April to consider preparations for 
                                                          
13 Telegram DFD 98 to LDN (Canadian High Commission) 24 February 1978. 
14 Memorandum DFD to KGO (Klaus Goldschlag) 1 April 1978. 
15 Albert Legault and Michel Fortman, A Diplomacy of Hope: Canada and Disarmament 1945–88 (Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992), 370. 
 Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 52/2016        12 
 
UNSSOD I. There were both policy and political motivations underlying the prime minister’s 
interest in arms control matters. Trudeau’s antipathy to nuclear weapons and distrust of the 
military have been well documented. He had taken a political stance against nuclear weapons 
from the start and, as one historian has remarked, “Indeed in 1963 he had delayed his entry into 
politics to protest the Liberal Party’s decision to accept US nuclear arms for the Canadian 
military.”16 His anti-nuclear weapon disposition was also in line with contemporary public 
opinion. As noted by Robert Bothwell, “Trudeau’s passionate opposition to nuclear weapons 
should have come as no surprise. They were consistent with his earlier statements and with 
faltering public support in Canada: by 1966 more Canadians opposed nuclear weapons than 
favoured them.”17 This anti-nuclear public opinion was particularly salient in Quebec where the 
prime minister’s political fortunes were engaged in the struggle against the PQ separatist 
government elected in 1976. Having gained attention and praise from some European leaders, 
notably Helmut Schmidt, with his earlier decision in 1969 to terminate Canada’s nuclear strike 
role within NATO, Trudeau may also have been influenced by the German chancellor’s thinking 
and his expressed fear over nuclear force postures that might provoke “an exchange of nuclear 
munitions which would reduce central Europe to an uninhabitable wasteland.”18 
Whatever the mix of motivations behind his policy direction, Trudeau appears to have 
provided a positive impetus to the forward-leaning ideas being generated by the Department of 
External Affairs for the special session. By early May, Undersecretary of State Gotlieb, in a 
memorandum to the minister, was able to state that the “Prime Minister expressed the hope that 
the Canadian statement would represent a fresh approach to disarmament.” Gotlieb continued by 
characterizing the draft text of the statement appended to the memorandum as an attempt “to 
meet the Prime Minister’s point without cutting across common Alliance interests.” The 
                                                          
16 Greg Donaghy, “‘The ghost of peace’: Pierre Trudeau’s search for peace 1982–84,” Peace Research 39, no. 1/2 
(2007): 39. 
17 Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945–84 (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2007), 284. This view is corroborated by Legault and Fortman: “Trudeau was quite simply an 
antimilitarist, distrustful of the military, and above all totally opposed to nuclear weapons,” A Diplomacy of Hope, 
203. 
18 Head and Trudeau, The Canadian Way, 273. 
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department, while endorsing the proposals generated by Hammond and company, was also 
sensitive to their compatibility with existing NATO policies and postures.  
The suffocation motif is explicitly used within the draft text of the statement: “the best 
way of arresting the dynamic of the nuclear arms race may be by a strategy of suffocation, by 
literally depriving the arms race of the oxygen on which it feeds.”19 Although this image must 
have appealed to many as a vivid way of describing the effect of the specialized constraints on 
nuclear weapon development Canada was proposing, no doubt others would have been anxious 
about how Canada’s advocating the “strangling” of the superpowers in their pursuit of military 
advantage might be perceived by those concerned. At the same time, Trudeau may have believed 
that his advocacy of a new level of cooperation between the superpowers would enjoy support 
from US president Jimmy Carter who, at their February 1977 meeting, had encouraged the prime 
minister to promote nuclear non-proliferation.20 
It seems clear that the prime minister’s personal engagement in the nuclear disarmament 
file imparted a priority to this subject that the responsible departments would not have granted it 
if left to their own devices. In an illuminating observation, George Ignatieff, who served as 
departmental adviser on disarmament as well as Canadian ambassador to the Disarmament 
Conference, having noted that he received his instructions from a joint DEA-DND committee, 
remarked, “To say that disarmament did not rank as a high priority with either department would 
be an understatement.” What support for robust action there was, he continued, “was largely 
because of the importance the prime minister personally seemed to attach to the issue. To my 
pleasant surprise he invited me to spend an evening at 24 Sussex Drive when I was in Canada for 
a brief visit, and I found that we were in fundamental agreement on the need to do whatever we 
could to slow down or preferably reverse the nuclear arms race.”21 
The development of the draft speech seems to have fallen largely to Klaus Goldschlag 
who, while careful to put each successive draft before Minister of External Affairs Donald 
                                                          
19 Memorandum to the Minister from A.E. Gotlieb, 2 May 1978.  
20 John English, Just Watch Me: The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau 1968–2000 (Toronto: Knopf Canada, 2009), 377.  
21 George Ignatieff, The Making of a Peacemonger: The Memoirs of George Ignatieff (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1985), 245–246. 
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Jamieson, appears to have been interacting directly with the prime minister. Minister Jamieson’s 
involvement in the development of the speech seems marginal and he may have judged it best 
not to get in the way of an initiative with which the prime minister was engaged. An initial text 
of 3 May was followed by a second dated 11 May, which Goldschlag indicated reflected the 
prime minister’s comments and led to “the addition of a fairly extended historical section … 
which lays an intellectual basis for the Canadian proposals.”22 This elaboration of the intellectual 
foundation for Canada’s specific proposals bears the hallmark of a prime ministerial intervention 
and transcends the usual bureaucratic emphasis on highlighting the proposals themselves rather 
than their philosophic antecedents. Despite Trudeau’s evident oversight of the development of 
the Canadian statement, as late as 16 May there was still some question about whether the prime 
minister or Minister Jamieson would go to New York to deliver the speech. A third draft of the 
speech was conveyed by Klaus Goldschlag on 18 May and it was not until 23 May that the prime 
minister decided to deliver the speech himself. This choice was all the more remarkable given 
that he had not once addressed the UN General Assembly during his previous ten years in power 
and suggests a personal investment in the speech. Canada was assigned the first speaking slot in 
the afternoon session on Friday, 26 May 1978, a day after Vice President Mondale for the US 
and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko for the USSR had spoken.  
The Strategy of Suffocation Explained 
The speech delivered by Prime Minister Trudeau still stands up, over three decades later, 
as a powerful example of oratory and model for generating a creative menu of measures 
available to the international community to counter the nuclear juggernaut, in spite of the fact 
that few were actually taken up in the form Trudeau advocated. 
Trudeau, perhaps conscious that some might view his effort to advise the superpowers as 
presumptuous, begins by laying out Canada’s credentials for addressing the nuclear problem. It 
is, after all, a country “geographically placed between two heavily armed superpowers, with an 
                                                          
22 Note from Klaus Goldschlag to PM, via Minister of External Affairs, 11 May 1978. 
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obvious stake in the prevention of war in a nuclear age.”23 Despite belonging to a defensive 
alliance that includes three out of the five nuclear weapon states, “We are none the less a country 
that has renounced the production of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons under 
our control. We have withdrawn from any nuclear role by Canada’s armed forces in Europe and 
are now in the process of replacing with conventional armed aircraft the nuclear-capable planes 
still assigned to our forces in North America. We are thus not only the first country in the world 
with the capacity to produce nuclear weapons that chose not to do so; we are also the first 
nuclear-armed country to have chosen to divest itself of nuclear arms.”24 
Having broadcast Canada’s nuclear disarmament credentials, Trudeau sets the historical 
and intellectual stage for engaging the century-old “great debate” of “how to achieve security 
through disarmament.” The terms of this debate, he continues, have been altered in the last 
quarter of a century by two developments: “One was the advent of nuclear weapons which has 
forced us to assimilate the concept of unusable power. The other was the transformation of the 
political map which has brought a whole host of new international actors into the disarmament 
debate.”25 
He notes that a declaratory approach had for long characterized disarmament efforts, 
citing the 1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact, with its renunciation of war, as a classic example. This 
approach lives on in declarations of no-first use of nuclear weapons (declarations that the USSR 
had made without reciprocity from the West). While Trudeau acknowledges that such 
declarations “give expression and authority to a widely shared perception of international 
morality,” he continues, “it is important not to mistake the shadow for the substance. 
Declarations of good intent are no substitute for real disarmament.”26 
Real disarmament measures have been achieved in the past and Trudeau enumerates the 
existing treaty-enshrined prohibitions on biological weapons and the placement of nuclear 
                                                          
23 UN General Assembly Tenth special session, “Provisional Verbatim Record of the Sixth Meeting” A/S-10/PV.6, 
26 May 1978, 5. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 6. 
26 Ibid., 7. 
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weapons in outer space or on the seabed. He counters claims that such measures are peripheral 
and argues “they are a great advance over declarations of intentions because they deal with 
capabilities and they are therefore verifiable—which intentions are not.” It is all about 
foreclosing risky options “that are real and, in the absence of restraint, inescapable.” Restraint 
will require coming to grips with what Trudeau describes as “the technological impulse that 
continues to lie behind the development of strategic nuclear weapons.” Since it can take a decade 
to move a new weapon system from research through to production and deployment, 
governments are saddled with policies that are a function of weapon procurement decisions taken 
years before. In a warning that still resonates today, Trudeau observes, that in such a situation 
“there is a risk that foreign policy can become the servant of defence policy, which is not the 
natural order of policy-making.”27 
Recognizing that unchecked nuclear weapon development can heighten concerns over the 
possibility of a disarming first strike or complicate greatly the verification challenge by blurring 
the line between nuclear and conventional weaponry, Trudeau concludes, “stable deterrence 
remains an inadequate concept. And such a concept is a poor substitute for genuine world 
security.” Similarly, contemporary strategic arms limitation negotiations between the 
superpowers have demonstrated that while it is possible to codify an existing balance of forces 
via such arrangements, it is difficult “to go beyond that and to cut back on weapons systems once 
they have been developed and deployed.” This leads Trudeau to his conclusion that “the best 
way of arresting the dynamic of the nuclear arms race may be by a strategy of suffocation, by 
depriving the arms race of the oxygen on which it feeds.”28 
A Package of Measures 
The striking metaphor is backed up with four practical measures for accomplishing the 
goal of arms race “suffocation.” Trudeau acknowledges that each of these measures has been 
independently suggested previously, but suggests that it is their combination that represents “a 
                                                          
27 Ibid., 11. 
28 Ibid., 12. 
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more efficient and a more promising approach to curbing the nuclear arms race.”29 The measures 
are 1) a comprehensive nuclear test ban, 2) a cessation of flight testing of new strategic delivery 
vehicles, 3) a prohibition on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, and 4) an 
agreement “to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear 
weapons systems.”30 
The “strategy of suffocation” represented by this package would transcend the merely 
declaratory and have a real impact on the nuclear arms race. It would have that impact, Trudeau 
expounds, “by freezing the available amount of fissionable material; by preventing any 
technology that may be developed in the laboratory from being tested; and by reducing the funds 
devoted to military expenditure.” Trudeau suggests that his strategy is a more realistic option 
than calls for total nuclear disarmament and could reduce the risks of a nuclear conflict that is 
fuelled by “the technological momentum of strategic competition.” 31 
Trudeau ends this section of his speech (which goes on to address issues of horizontal 
proliferation and conventional arms control) with a politic nod to the recent decision by US 
president Jimmy Carter to forego the development of the neutron bomb. Trudeau commends 
Carter’s “far-sighted postponement of a decision to produce a special battlefield nuclear 
weapon.”32 This is an example of the superpower restraint in the development of nuclear 
weapons that Trudeau believes could be rendered mutual and suitably codified if the US and 
USSR would only embrace the “strategy of suffocation” he has outlined.  
Reactions and Outcomes 
That embrace by the superpowers was not forthcoming, although elements of the Trudeau 
package have remained central to nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts up to the present. 
The goal of a comprehensive test ban was realized with the adoption of a Comprehensive 
(Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996: however, an extremely demanding entry into force 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 13. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 14. 
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provision of that treaty requiring the ratification of 44 individual states has prevented it formally 
taking effect. The ban on fissile material production for nuclear weapons has been repeatedly 
endorsed by the international community as a priority objective, yet its realization has just as 
frequently been stymied by one or more key actors, with the net result that negotiations of such a 
ban have never commenced. A ban on flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles has not 
featured in the negotiations between the US and the USSR/Russian Federation although similar 
constraints on the development of selected capacities and the deployment of existing ones have 
featured in their bilateral strategic agreements (e.g., bans on anti-ballistic missile systems, new 
“heavy” missiles, and MIRVed warheads). While the closing of the funding tap for nuclear 
weapon development was and remains a very effective constraint on the arms race dynamic, it 
too has proven beyond the capacity of the major nuclear powers to agree on, and all of the overt 
nuclear powers are engaged in modernization programs for their nuclear forces. 
It appears that Trudeau’s speech was well received at the time as the general debate 
segment of UNSSOD got underway. Citing reactions from other delegations and UN Secretariat 
officials, the Canadian ambassador to the UN, Bill Barton, wrote on 2 June, “the speech was the 
most substantial and one of the two or three most important addresses of those delivered thus 
far.”33 He noted that positive reactions had come from all quarters and that even the Soviet and 
Polish ambassadors had expressed their admiration. NGO representatives had given the speech 
particularly high praise, which would have come as a relief to those in Ottawa concerned with 
Canadian public opinion on this increasingly hot topic. The Canadian media gave it mixed 
reviews: positive on the part of the Toronto Star and Le Devoir, sharply negative on the part of 
the Globe and Mail. The prime minister seemed particularly upset at media suggestions that his 
address to UNSSOD was a publicity gimmick (as if a speech at the UN General Assembly 
actually generated media coverage).34 
Notwithstanding the positive reactions at UNSSOD, Ambassador Barton flagged that 
getting elements of Trudeau’s speech incorporated into the outcome document of the special 
session itself would be a challenge: “How we will fare remains to be seen, but we shall give it a 
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good try.”35 He specifically raised the question of whether the Americans and Russians would be 
prepared to live with the proposal for a ban on flight testing of new strategic delivery vehicles. 
Ambassador Barton’s diplomatic instincts were correct and it soon became evident that 
not all of the measures enumerated by Trudeau would find a home in the consensus outcome 
document. The US delegation indicated that both the flight-testing and fissile material production 
bans “were more specific than they would like the Plan of Action to be.”36 In reporting back to 
the State Department, the US UN mission, which had not remarked on Trudeau’s speech as such, 
flagged that “Canada is the only country besides France to have introduced language that the US 
cannot accept: a call for a ban on flight testing of intercontinental missiles.”37 In a not unfamiliar 
tactic, the Americans referred to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) being at a 
sensitive stage in Congress and the need to avoid the impression in Washington of external 
pressures being created. Overall, neither the US nor the USSR was open to considering ideas for 
strategic stability and arsenal reductions that did not originate with themselves. Despite this 
countervailing intervention, it appears that the minister of external affairs agreed that Canada 
should retain both items in its policy.  
The final document of UNSSOD I, which was endorsed by all participating delegations, 
necessarily reflected a compromise among the varied priorities and interests of the states 
involved. Ambassador Barton in his wrap-up report on the special session gave a positive spin to 
the results in expressing satisfaction with the “implicit if not explicit coverage of elements in 
Canada’s suffocation proposals in appropriate paragraphs.”38 Certainly the call for a treaty 
prohibiting nuclear testing figured in the final document, but beyond that widely shared goal it 
was difficult to identify much of Trudeau’s package of measures in the final text. The need for 
qualitative as well as quantitative disarmament measures for halting the arms race was noted at 
several places in the document, an important conceptual gain, although no specificity was given 
to how this objective could be achieved. Some echoes of Trudeau’s critique of nuclear deterrence 
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could be found in the document and the high levels of military spending are roundly condemned, 
but essentially because they detract from development efforts without reference to their driving 
role in the nuclear arms race. A major measure like Trudeau’s proposed ban on the production of 
fissile material for nuclear weapons was retained but diluted into a general call for negotiations 
to cease the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the fissile material from which they 
are produced. Any purposeful, near-term action on the fissile material ban was effectively killed 
by the nuclear weapon states that were still in the process of building up their nuclear arsenals 
and were not amenable to cutting off the oxygen supply to this or any other part of their nuclear 
weapons complexes. The specific “strategy of suffocation” proposals by Canada were relegated 
(like those of 32 other states submitting documents to the special session) to an annex-like listing 
at the end of the final document.39 
American diplomatic cables for this period indicate that Prime Minister Trudeau’s SSOD 
remarks had received little attention and less concern. What had exercised the US Embassy in 
Ottawa and the State Department in May 1978 were Canada’s objections to a draft NATO Long 
Term Program of Defense Spending (LTDP) that was to be adopted at an Alliance Summit to be 
held in Washington only a few days after the UNSSOD debate. Apparently, this objection 
originated with the prime minister and reflected “Trudeau’s interest in making defense policy 
consonant with foreign policy” by ensuring that leaders set the priorities for the NATO 
bureaucracy and not the other way around. Whatever its origins, the Canadian stance was clearly 
alarming for the US and its NATO Summit planning. The American ambassador Tom Enders 
met with Deputy Undersecretary Goldschlag on 3 May to voice “our surprise and deep concern 
over GOC approach to LTDP.” The effect of the Canadian campaign on LTDP “could be to blow 
major US initiative out of water just when it is about to succeed” according to Enders cabled 
account of his exchange with Goldschlag. He followed up this démarche two days later with De 
Montigny Marchand, deputy secretary to the Cabinet, who was described in the embassy cable as 
a close adviser to Trudeau. According to the American account, Marchand relayed a reply from 
Trudeau that “he [Trudeau] has no desire to be an obstructionist, and that he realizes the 
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President, as host of the Summit, should have primary say on this problem.”40 While the prime 
minister seems to have been willing to concede the point on alliance defence spending targets in 
deference to President Carter and his role as host of the NATO Summit, he evidently believed 
strongly in the need for political control and direction of military affairs. His reference in his 
UNSSOD speech to the “risk that foreign policy can become the servant of defence policy” is 
further evidence of this conviction.   
Conclusions and Legacy 
Given the diplomatic context of UNSSOD and the necessity to forge an outcome that all 
participating states could accept, it would have been unrealistic to expect more extensive take-up 
of Trudeau’s proposals in the final document. At the same time, his speech was an impressive 
example of an intellectually coherent critique of the existing nuclear disorder and a practical set 
of measures that if taken up comprehensively could effectively halt the arms race that was the 
core concern of the international community. The speech’s emphases on tangible over 
declaratory measures and the importance of verification and transparency provisions to support 
agreements have been refrains of Canadian policy for some time. The military-technical dynamic 
that propels the constant search to obtain strategic superiority over potential adversaries was 
rightly viewed by Trudeau as a motor of the arms race requiring political control and mutual 
restraint. The United States and the Soviet Union were taking initial steps in this regard during 
the UNSSOD period, having concluded SALT II and initiated discussion on further reductions, 
but the checkered record of bilateral strategic limitations agreements since then has demonstrated 
the difficulty of curbing existing arms races and preventing new ones. 
Perhaps the most enduring effect of the prime minister’s “strategy of suffocation” speech 
was the impetus it provided within the Canadian bureaucracy to build the capacity required to 
play a significant role in international arms control and disarmament affairs. In a memorandum 
to the prime minister shortly after the conclusion of the UNSSOD, the minister of external 
affairs, noting that “the Special Session on Disarmament had aroused the expectations of many 
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Canadians,” announced that he was creating a new office of the Advisor on Disarmament and 
Arms Control Affairs. The first incumbent would be Geoffrey Pearson, the then director general 
of the UN Bureau. The prime minister simply wrote “excellent” in the margins of the paragraph 
referring to the new office and its staffing.41 As with the earlier decision to appoint Ken 
Williamson as a public liaison officer for disarmament matters, the Department of External 
Affairs, with prime ministerial blessing, was establishing some of the institutional capacity 
necessary to exercise leadership in the demanding realm of international arms control and 
disarmament. 
Looking back at this engagement in arms control and disarmament a few years later, 
Allan Gotlieb presented it as something of a Canadian vocation. He wrote: “Canada’s strong role 
in disarmament activity has always been a natural calling, with broad public support and strong 
specialized constituencies.”42 He also indicated that Canada’s investment in technical as well as 
diplomatic capacities would enable it to contribute to the development of arms control 
agreements. As he stated, “the Canadian reputation for multilateral diplomacy and technical skill 
enables a national contribution to the technical side of arms control negotiations—such as on the 
principles and techniques of verification.”43 
It was indeed for its contribution to arms control verification, especially through the work 
of DEA’s Verification Research Unit established in the wake of Prime Minister Trudeau’s peace 
initiative of 1983, that Canada was best known and celebrated within the multilateral 
disarmament community. The political and financial support for this verification focus and the 
diplomatic activism that built on it enabled Canada to assume leadership roles on several arms 
control and disarmament files. These included work on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (one of 
the specific measures from Trudeau’s speech), contributions to the International Monitoring 
System underpinning the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty concluded in 1996 (another goal of the 
speech), innovative work on the verification of outer space arms control (the “PAXSAT” study), 
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and the technical studies supporting the successful advocacy by Canada of a ban on anti-
personnel landmines (the Ottawa Convention of 1997). This was emblematic of the leadership 
Canada was able to exercise for several decades following UNSSOD I under the continuing 
impetus and influence afforded by Pierre Trudeau’s “strategy of suffocation” and the institutional 
support provided to implement it. 
 
